Å vite hva man tror

"Å vite hva man tror - Selverkjennelse og førstepersonautoritet hos Davidson, Hacker og Wittgenstein"
("Knowing your beliefs - Self-knowledge and first-person authority in Davidson, Hacker and Wittgenstein")
Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift (Norwegian Journal of Philosophy), Vol. 44, Nr. 1, s. 66-77, 2009.

First person authority has become a main philosophical topic the last decades. The current paper examines Peter Hacker’s criticism of two classic articles by Donald Davidson on first person authority. It also discusses Hacker’s use of some remarks from Wittgenstein in the course of this criticism. It is argued, first, that both Hacker and Davidson disregard how questions of self-knowledge are both central to and pervasive in human life. Second, Hacker’s position leads to a fairly typical philosophical quandary: we run into a position where we are forced to choose between the false and the weird (moreover, it just this hovering between falsity and weirdness that creates the illusion of substantial truth in Hacker’s view). Third, Hacker and Davidson have more in common than Hacker acknowledges, but the features that unite them separate them from Wittgenstein’s view of philosophy.

Key words: first person authority, self-knowledge, Hacker, Davidson, Wittgenstein